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Assessment of protection against reinfection with 
SARS-CoV-2 among 4 million PCR-tested individuals in 
Denmark in 2020: a population-level observational study
Christian Holm Hansen*, Daniela Michlmayr*, Sophie Madeleine Gubbels, Kåre Mølbak, Steen Ethelberg
Summary
Background The degree to which infection with SARS-CoV-2 confers protection towards subsequent reinfection is not 
well described. In 2020, as part of Denmark’s extensive, free-of-charge PCR-testing strategy, approximately 4 million 
individuals (69% of the population) underwent 10·6 million tests. Using these national PCR-test data from 2020, 
we estimated protection towards repeat infection with SARS-CoV-2.
Methods In this population-level observational study, we collected individual-level data on patients who had been 
tested in Denmark in 2020 from the Danish Microbiology Database and analysed infection rates during the second 
surge of the COVID-19 epidemic, from Sept 1 to Dec 31, 2020, by comparison of infection rates between individuals 
with positive and negative PCR tests during the first surge (March to May, 2020). For the main analysis, we excluded 
people who tested positive for the first time between the two surges and those who died before the second surge. We 
did an alternative cohort analysis, in which we compared infection rates throughout the year between those with and 
without a previous confirmed infection at least 3 months earlier, irrespective of date. We also investigated whether 
differences were found by age group, sex, and time since infection in the alternative cohort analysis. We calculated 
rate ratios (RRs) adjusted for potential confounders and estimated protection against repeat infection as 1 – RR.
Findings During the first surge (ie, before June, 2020), 533 381 people were tested, of whom 11 727 (2·20%) were PCR 
positive, and 525 339 were eligible for follow-up in the second surge, of whom 11 068 (2·11%) had tested positive 
during the first surge. Among eligible PCR-positive individuals from the first surge of the epidemic, 72 (0·65% 
[95% CI 0·51–0·82]) tested positive again during the second surge compared with 16 819 (3·27% [3·22–3·32]) of 
514 271 who tested negative during the first surge (adjusted RR 0·195 [95% CI 0·155–0·246]). Protection against 
repeat infection was 80·5% (95% CI 75·4–84·5). The alternative cohort analysis gave similar estimates 
(adjusted RR 0·212 [0·179–0·251], estimated protection 78·8% [74·9–82·1]). In the alternative cohort analysis, among 
those aged 65 years and older, observed protection against repeat infection was 47·1% (95% CI 24·7–62·8). We found 
no difference in estimated protection against repeat infection by sex (male 78·4% [72·1–83·2] vs female 79·1% 
[73·9–83·3]) or evidence of waning protection over time (3–6 months of follow-up 79·3% [74·4–83·3] vs ≥7 months 
of follow-up 77·7% [70·9–82·9]).
Interpretation Our findings could inform decisions on which groups should be vaccinated and advocate for vaccination 
of previously infected individuals because natural protection, especially among older people, cannot be relied on.
Funding None.
Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
SARS-CoV-2, the cause of the COVID-19 epidemic, has 
resulted in over 117 million cases and over 2·6 million 
deaths worldwide as of March 7, 2021, as estimated by 
WHO. The presence or absence of protective immunity 
after infection with, or vaccination against, SARS-CoV-2 
will affect transmission of the virus and severity of 
illness.1 The absence of pre-existing immunity to 
SARS-CoV-2 is thought to be responsible for the rapid 
spread of the virus globally and for the continuing 
pandemic. Therefore, greater understanding of the 
degree of protection against reinfection with SARS-
CoV-2 is essential to refine appropriate intervention 
strategies.
Little is known about protection against SARS-CoV-2 
repeat infections but two studies in the UK have found 
that immunity could last at least 5–6 months after 
infection.1–3 These data suggest that reinfection with 
SARS-CoV-2 is rare and occurs in less than 1% of 
individuals who previously tested positive for SARS-
CoV-2. These findings are consistent with several single or 
small case studies, with only up to six patients, done in the 
USA, China, South Korea, and India, that found reinfec-
tion to occur within 26–142 days after the first infection, 
supported by genetic evidence and negative PCR test 
results in between the two infections. 4–7 The closely related 
viruses SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV induced immunity 
that typically lasted 2–3 years after infection.8–10
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Denmark recorded its first positive SARS-CoV-2 case on 
Feb 27, 2020.11 Similar to other European countries, the 
epidemic was characterised by two infection surges (waves) 
in 2020, one in spring (March–May) and one in autumn–
winter (September–December). Denmark has been doing 
high intensity testing for SARS-CoV-2 infection among 
its 5·8 million residents, with invest ment in test facilities 
done with the wider aim of keeping society open whenever 
possible. In addition to PCR tests done on symptomatic 
individuals by referral within the national health-care 
system, a parallel national testing system, primarily 
targeting non-symptomatic individuals, became widely 
available from May, 2020, known as TestCenter Denmark. 
As part of this parallel testing system, nation wide test 
stations offered free PCR testing to all residents aged 
18 years and older, with subse quent expansion to everyone 
older than 2 years in September, 2020. The number of test 
stations has been gradually increasing over 2020, and by 
Dec 31, 2020, more than 10 million PCR tests had been 
done in Denmark on 3·96 million individuals in total. All 
tests are unequivocally person identifiable, which allows 
iden tification of individuals with more than one positive 
test at a national scale. The aim of our study was to esti-
mate protection against repeat infections as measured 
by PCR positivity of SARS-CoV-2, including whether 
the estimated protection resulting from a first infection 
differed by age group, sex, or time period since infection.
Methods
Study design, data collection, and surveillance system
In this population-level observational study, we collected 
individual-level data from the Danish Microbiology 
Database (MiBa) for all individuals who had a PCR test 
for SARS-CoV-2 between Feb 26 and Dec 31, 2020. 
Electronic records of bookings and results are captured 
in the MiBa in a person-identifiable format and enriched 
with data (including age, sex, and vital status) from the 
civil registry system and other registries by the automated 
national surveillance system.12,13 The surveillance system 
is hosted and maintained by Statens Serum Institut (SSI; 
Copenhagen, Denmark), the Danish National Institute 
for Infectious Disease Control and Prevention.
At each PCR-testing site that is part of TestCenter 
Denmark, throat swabs are collected and transported 
to central high-throughput laboratory facilities (one on 
the SSI campus or one that opened on Dec 7, 2020, 
in Aarhus, Denmark) and tested by PCR. Appointments 
for PCR tests are booked electronically or by telephone, 
with test results generally available within 48 h (positive, 
negative, or inconclusive) and communicated to the 
patient online via personal electronic health records 
(and their primary care physician). For those who were 
tested via referral as part of the national health-care 
testing system, patients attended hospitals or primary 
care centres and throat swabs were taken for PCR 
testing and transported to one of ten main clinical, 
public, microbiological laboratories. Depending on 
whether patients were tested as part of the national 
health-care system or TestCenter Denmark, different 
PCR platforms were used. The clinical microbiology 
laboratories applied a range of CE-marked commercial 
platforms or in-house assays that were all quality 
controlled according to clinical microbiology diagnostic 
standards. The TestCenter Denmark laboratory applied 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed and the bioRxiv and medRxiv preprint 
servers for publications between Sept 1, 2019, and 
Feb 14, 2021, without language restrictions, using the terms 
(“SARS-CoV-2” OR “COVID-19” OR “COVID” OR “coronavirus”) 
AND “reinfection” AND “immunity”. For preprint articles, 
we included the search term “human” and found 695 articles, 
of which 192 were published on the bioRxiv server and 503 on 
the medRxiv server. On PubMed, we found 112 peer-reviewed 
publications, and after filtering by human studies we identified 
48 articles. Most of these peer-reviewed articles report that 
reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 is a rare event occurring in less 
than 1% of COVID-19 cases. Next, we repeated our PubMed 
search and changed the search term “reinfection” to 
“seroprevalence” to assess immunity to SARS-CoV-2 in the 
population at a given time. We identified 47 studies that 
reported a seroprevalence of SARS-CoV-2 based on serum 
antibody responses of 0·37–22·1%, highlighting the absence or 
low level of immunity in the population overall. When looking 
at natural immunity, we identified three cohort studies: 
one peer-reviewed article of reinfections in residents in 
two nursing care homes and two preprint articles, one that 
followed up 43 000 individuals in Qatar and found an 
estimated 95% protection against reinfection, and one of over 
20 000 health-care workers in the UK that found an 83% lower 
risk of reinfection for at least 5 months after the first infection.
Added value of this study
Through analysis of Danish population-level surveillance data 
with more than 10 million person-identifiable PCR test results 
in 2020, we estimated protective immunity to be 
approximately 80–83% in people younger than 65 years. 
We found no difference in immunity over the study period. 
Among those aged 65 years and older, immunity was estimated 
to be approximately 47%.
Implications of all the available evidence
Natural infection with SARS-CoV-2 led to observed protection 
against reinfection estimated to be approximately 80% after 
6 months. However, the observed low natural immunity in 
people aged 65 years and older underlines the need to vaccinate 
previously infected individuals, in particular in this age group.
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an RT-PCR assay with the E gene on SARS-CoV-2 as 
the target.14,15 
In December, 2020, rapid antigen testing also became 
freely available in separate dedicated public test stations 
(commercial antigen testing had been available to 
purchase before this date); these tests were not captured 
by surveillance and are not included in this analysis. The 
analyses we present in this Article are based on data 
extracted from the national surveillance system and 
covers all PCR tests, both those done within the national 
health-care system and in TestCenter Denmark.
Our analyses are based on existing Danish national 
COVID-19 surveillance data and did not require ethical 
approval. A copy of the protocol is available online.
Analysis of infections and reinfections during the 
second surge
For inclusion in this analysis, we selected all people in the 
country with a positive or negative PCR test from the 
first surge of the epidemic—ie, before June 1, 2020 (all 
inconclusive test results [approximately 1% of all tests] 
were removed from the dataset before analysis). We then 
followed up this cohort through the second surge of 
the epidemic—from Sept 1 to Dec 31, 2020—to see who 
contracted a (PCR-confirmed) SARS-CoV-2 infection 
during this period. The rates of infection during the second 
surge were compared across those with a positive or 
negative test from the first surge. Individuals who tested 
positive for the first time during the period June 1 to Aug 31 
(ie, between the end of the first surge and the beginning of 
the second surge) were excluded from the analysis, as were 
people who died from any cause before Sept 1, 2020.
We calculated the rate of infection as the number of 
individuals with positive PCR tests during the second 
surge divided by the cumulative number of person-days 
at risk. We calculated the number of days at risk for each 
individual in the sample as the number of days from 
Sept 1, 2020, until the first positive test, or Dec 31, 2020, 
whichever came first. We censored follow-up time in 
the event of death. This non-informative censoring 
mechanism essentially assumed a similar infection rate 
would have been observed among those who died if they 
had survived, as was observed among the survivors with 
the same exposure status (whether previously infected 
or uninfected). We calculated the adjusted rate ratio (RR) 
and accompanying 95% CI using Poisson regression, 
adjusted for sex, age group (0–5, 6–14, 15–24, 25–34, 
35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65–74, 75–84, and ≥85 years), and 
test frequency (number of PCR tests done on each 
person in 2020 categorised as 1–2, 3–5, 6–10, and 
≥11 tests) to control for potential confounding. Protection 
against repeat infections was calculated as 1 – adjusted 
RR, analogous to the method of estimating vaccine 
effectiveness from observational data.
Because people were prone to have more tests done if 
they thought they might be at increased risk of infection, 
there was a possibility of bias in the main analysis, 
especially if testing patterns differed among those with 
and without a previous positive test. For this reason, we 
did a sensitivity analysis in which we repeated the main 
analysis in a subgroup of people (nurses, doctors, social 
workers, and health-care assistants) who were tested 
frequently and routinely as part of their profession 
(details on professions were obtained through linkage 
with the registry on health authorisations from the 
Danish Patient Safety Authority).11
To determine the extent to which our findings 
depended on the gap between the first and second surge 
(ie, the minimum length of time allowed between repeat 
positive tests for an individual to be categorised as 
reinfected), we did two further sensitivity analyses, 
one in which the second surge began on Aug 1, 2020 
(ie, 2 months after the end of the first surge), and one in 
which it began on Oct 1, 2020 (ie, 4 months after the 
end of the first surge). The period for the first surge was 
unchanged.
Alternative cohort analysis
Using an alternative analysis approach, we made full 
use of the available data to investigate rates of reinfec-
tion throughout the epidemic, not just during the 
second surge. Each individual with a PCR test result 
was followed up from the time of their first test, 
irrespective of the date and whether they had a positive 
or negative result, until Dec 31, 2020, or a new positive 
test at least 90 days later. If the initial test was negative, 
a subsequent positive test within the 90 days changed 
an individual’s status from uninfected to previously 
infected. We compared the infection rate observed 
during follow-up when people were uninfected with 
the rate observed during follow-up of people who were 
previously infected. Those who tested positive during 
follow-up for the first time (ie, who had initially 
contributed time as an uninfected individual) remained 
in follow-up but, from the date of their first infection, 
contributed time as a previously infected individual. 
We estimated the adjusted RR using the same methods 
as for the main analysis, except the model was 
additionally adjusted for start month of follow-up 
(through inclusion of indicator variables) to minimise 
confounding due to variations in the underlying 
infection rate over time.
Variations by age, sex, and time since first infection
To assess whether the level of protection conferred by 
previous infection differed by sex or age, we expanded 
the alternative cohort analysis to include interaction 
terms with sex and age group (restricted to four age 
groups [0–34, 35–49, 50–64, ≥65 years] to avoid strata 
with few events). This expansion allowed us to calculate 
a protective effect estimate separately for each age 
group and by sex, and to test for evidence of effect modi-
fication using a likelihood ratio test. We used a similar 
approach to compare the level of protection against 
For protocol see https://covid19.
ssi.dk/repinfprotocol
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repeat infections as measured by positive PCR test 
before and after the first 6 months of follow-up. We did 
this analysis by splitting time at risk into two periods for 
those with more than 180 days of follow-up (individuals 
with <181 days of follow-up contributed with just a 
single period not exceeding 6 months), the first from 0 
to 180 days, and the second from day 181 until the end of 
follow-up, whether through a positive test result, death, 
or study end. We included an interaction term with 
period in the model to allow for separate assessment of 
protection against repeat infections as measured by 
PCR positivity for the two periods. We also plotted a 
Kaplan-Meier curve of time until infection during 
follow-up.
We report proportions calculated using exact (Clopper-
Pearson) 95% CIs. We did all analyses using SAS 
version 9.4 and generated graphs using Graphpad Prism 
(version 8.3.0).
Role of the funding source
There was no funding source for this study.
Results
The capacity to do PCR testing for SARS-CoV-2 in 
Denmark increased rapidly over 2020, from the first tests 
in February up to the end of the year, when approximately 
10% of the population was tested each week on average. 
During the first surge of the epidemic (ie, before June), 
533 381 people were tested, of whom 11 727 (2·20%) were 
PCR positive. During the second surge (from Sept 1 
to Dec 31, 2020), 3·48 million people were tested, of 
whom 150 159 (4·32%) tested positive (figure 1). By 
Dec 31, 2020, 3·96 million people—more than two-thirds 
of the population of 5·8 million people—had been tested 
at least once, of whom 2·55 million (64·4%) had been 
tested more than once (figure 2; appendix p 6).
After excluding 610 people who tested positive for the 
first time between the first and second surges of the 
epidemic, and a further 7432 who died (from any cause) 
before the second surge (of whom 659 had tested positive 
for SARS-CoV-2 during the first surge; appendix p 2), 
525 339 of those who were tested during the first surge 
of the epidemic remained in follow-up during the 
second surge. In this population, 11 068 (2·11%) indivi-
duals tested positive during the first surge, of whom 72 
(0·65% [95% CI 0·51–0·82]) tested positive again during 
the second surge compared with 16 819 (3·27% [95% CI 
3·22–3·32]) of 514 271 people who were negative during 
the first surge.
The daily rate of infection during the second surge 
was 5·35 positive tests per 100 000 people among those 
who had previously tested positive versus 27·06 per 
100 000 people among those who previously tested 
negative (table 1). The adjusted RR of infection 
was 0·195 (95% CI 0·155–0·246) among those who 
previously tested positive compared with those who 
had previously only tested negative. The estimated 
protection against repeat infection after previous 
SARS-CoV-2 infection was 80·5% (95% CI 75·4–84·5; 
table 1).
Test frequency during the second surge was a little 
higher among those who did not have a positive test 
result during the first surge than among those who 
tested positive during the first surge (appendix p 3). In a 
sensitivity analysis, we restricted the sample to the 
15 604 frequently tested nurses, doctors, social workers, 
and health-care assistants that were present in the 
sample. They had a median of 10 tests (IQR 9–12) done 
each in 2020, and 658 (4·2%) tested positive during the 
first surge (table 1). Eight (1·2%) of 658 who tested 
positive in the first surge also tested positive during the 
second surge. By contrast, among those who remained 
uninfected during the first surge, 934 (6·2%) of 
14 946 tested positive during the second surge. The 
adjusted RR was 0·189 (95% CI 0·094–0·379) and the 
Figure 1: Weekly incidence of PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 (A) and test rate (B) in Denmark over 2020
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estimated protection against reinfection was 81·1% 
(95% CI 62·1–90·6). Moving the date on which the 
second surge began in two sensitivity analyses, and 
thereby revising the definition of reinfection in our 
study by changing the gap between the first and second 
positive test, only slightly affected the estimated protec-
tion against repeat infection (table 1).
2 432 509 individuals were included in the alternative 
cohort analysis, with 28 875 (1·19%) individuals con-
tributing exposed time periods and 2 405 683 (98·90%) 
contributing unexposed time periods, with 2049 con-
tributing to both unexposed and exposed time periods, 
with a total of 138 reinfections. No individual tested 
positive more than twice. The results from this alternative 
cohort analysis were very similar to those of the main 
analysis (table 1), even though it was based on more 
events because of the additional follow-up time afforded 
by the analytical approach, which also allows for analysis 
of reinfection throughout the calendar year. The esti-
mated protection against repeat infection in this analysis 
was 78·8% (95% CI 74·9–82·1).
Also in the alternative cohort analysis, we found little 
evidence that the degree of protection against repeat 
infection as measured by PCR positivity conferred by 
previous infection varied by age group below age 65 years. 
However, protection against repeat infection among 
those aged 65 years and older was lower than among 
younger age groups (table 2). We found no evidence of 
differences in the estimates of protection against repeat 
infection by sex, nor did we find any evidence that 
protection against repeat infection was waning after 
6 months of follow-up (table 2; appendix p 7).
Discussion
We used a large national surveillance dataset of 
individually referable PCR test results to estimate the 
degree to which previous infection with SARS-CoV-2 
results in protection against repeat infection. We found 
protection in the population to be 80% or higher in those 
younger than 65 years, but to be approximately 47% in 
those aged 65 years and older. We did not see signs of 
waning protection against repeat infection within the 
year 2020.
Our estimates for overall protection after previous 
infection with SARS-CoV-2 of 77–83% are in line with 












Main analysis of reinfection during the second surge
Positive during first surge 11 068 72 1 346 920 5·35 0·195 (0·155–0·246) 80·5% (75·4–84·5)
Negative during first surge 514 271 16 819 62 151 056 27·06 1 (ref) ··
Alternative cohort analysis with reinfection at least 90 days after first infection‡
Exposed periods 28 875 138 2 447 924 5·64 0·212 (0·179–0·251) 78·8% (74·9–82·1)
Unexposed periods 2 405 683 53 991 174 487 793 30·94 1 (ref) ··
Sensitivity analyses of reinfection during the second surge
In frequently tested nurses, doctors, social workers, and health-care assistants
Positive during first surge 658 8 80 014 10·00 0·189 (0·094–0·379) 81·1% (62·1–90·6)
Negative during first surge 14 946 934 1 798 184 51·94 1 (ref) ··
If the second surge was Aug 1 to Dec 31, 2020§
Positive during first surge 11 068 87 1 687 700 5·15 0·233 (0·189–0·287) 76·7% (71·3–81·1)
Negative during first surge 514 562 17 110 78 098 000 21·91 1 (ref) ··
If the second surge was Oct 1 to Dec 31, 2020§
Positive during first surge 11 068 59 1 016 359 5·81 0·172 (0·133–0·222) 82·8% (77·8–86·7)
Negative during first surge 513 025 15 573 46 739 367 33·32 1 (ref) ··
*Rate of infection per 100 000 person-days of follow-up. †Adjusted for sex, age group, and test frequency, and, for the alternative cohort analysis only, start month of 
follow-up. ‡Exposed periods are periods of follow-up time contributed by individuals with previous infection and unexposed periods are contributed by individuals without 
a previous infection. §For the sensitivity analyses exploring 2 months  and 4 months of separation between the two surges, surge one was unchanged.
Table 1: Comparison of infection and reinfection rates before and after first SARS-CoV-2 infection in 2020 in Denmark
Figure 2: Number of tests per person
The total number of PCR tests done per person in Denmark in 2020 among the 
3·96 million people who were tested at least once. 
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several other cohort studies from the UK, Qatar, and 
the USA that reported reinfection to be rare and occurring 
in fewer than 1% of all COVID-19 cases.2,3,16,17 How long 
protection against repeat infection lasts after previous 
SARS-CoV-2 infection remains unknown because too 
little time has elapsed since the beginning of the 
pandemic, but one study of more than 20 000 health-care 
workers in the UK found that the risk of reinfection with 
SARS-CoV-2 was reduced by 83% for at least 5 months 
after primary infection.3 Another study of 12 541 health-
care workers in the UK showed 89% protection lasting 
at least 6 months.2 A study from Qatar screening 
43 000 people by PCR suggested that protection against 
repeat infection occurred for 95% of individuals who 
tested positive, lasting for at least 7 months.17 Previous 
studies have found that antibodies to other coronaviruses 
wane over time and allow for reinfection in the long term; 
however, the exact longevity of antibody responses after 
coronavirus infection is still uncertain. For circulating 
human coronavirus, the estimated period of protective 
immunity was 11 months.18 For MERS-CoV, antibodies 
were decreasing after approximately 5 months while 
immunity lasted up to 3 years, and for SARS-CoV, up to 
2 years.8–10,19 Estimates of seroprevalence of IgG antibodies 
against SARS-CoV-2 are variable depending on the 
laboratory methods used, selected cohort, geographical 
location, and ethnicity of participants and their socio-
economic background.20 In our study in which we 
classified time between infection and reinfection into two 
major time periods, late and early, we did not observe an 
effect that would indicate waning protection against repeat 
infections during our study period.
In addition to epidemiological studies, longitudinal 
serological and other immunological studies are needed 
to provide information on mechanisms of immunity 
against SARS-CoV-2 and its duration. An observational 
study from the USA that included 3·2 million people 
who had antibody tests for SARS-CoV-2 examined their 
subsequent PCR-test patterns.16 3 months after the 
index date of their serological test, PCR tests were 
positive for individuals with a negative SARS-CoV-2 
antibody test at least ten times more often than for 
those who had a positive antibody test.16 Many studies 
have examined adaptive immunity after SARS-CoV-2 
infection.1 In a longitudinal study of immunological 
memory to SARS-CoV-2, about 95% of individuals 
retained immunity for up to 8 months after infection 
based on measurements of antibodies, memory B cells, 
and CD4 and CD8 T cells.21 Although concentrations of 
antibodies against both SARS-CoV-2 spike and receptor 
binding domain decreased moderately over the 8-month 
study period, the number of memory B cells increased 
and memory CD4 and CD8 T cells had a half-life of 
3–5 months. Thus, the different types of immunological 
memory as part of the adaptive immune system were 
active but had distinct kinetics, and measurements of 
circulating antibodies did not appear to predict T-cell 
memory.
We estimated relatively low protection against reinfection 
in people aged 65 years or older compared with younger 
individuals. Those aged 65 years and older had less than 
50% protection against repeat SARS-CoV-2 infections 
after the first infection. However, another study group, 
who used a different study design, found a high degree of 
protection against reinfection among older people.22 Our 
finding that older people were more likely than younger 
people to test positive again if they had already tested 
positive could be explained by natural age-related changes 
in the immune system of older adults, also referred to as 
immune senescence. These changes affect both the innate 
Number of infections during 
follow-up













Overall 138 53 991 5·64 30·94 0·212 (0·179–0·251) 78·8% (74·9–82·1) ··
Sex
Female 78 30 225 5·68 30·87 0·209 (0·167–0·261) 79·1% (73·9–83·3) 0·84
Male 60 23 766 5·59 31·03 0·216 (0·168–0·279) 78·4% (72·1–83·2) ··
Age group, years
0–34 49 26 829 5·92 38·13 0·173 (0·131–0·229) 82·7% (77·1–86·9) <0·0001
35–49 32 12 071 5·16 31·92 0·199 (0·141–0·282) 80·1% (71·8–85·9) ··
50–64 26 10 111 4·25 27·42 0·187 (0·127–0·274) 81·3% (72·6–87·3) ··
≥65 31 4980 8·01 16·92 0·529 (0·372–0·753) 47·1% (24·7–62·8) ··
Time in follow-up, months
3–6 84 37 357 5·57 27·28 0·207 (0·167–0·256) 79·3% (74·4–83·3) 0·67
≥7 54 16 634 2·66 14·48 0·223 (0·171–0·291) 77·7% (70·9–82·9) ··
*Rate of infection per 100 000 person-days of follow-up. †Adjusted for sex, age group, test frequency, and start month of follow-up. ‡p value from likelihood ratio tests 
comparing models with and without interaction terms to capture evidence of effect heterogeneity across subgroups. 
Table 2: Protection against reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 by sex, age group, and time since first infection, in the alternative cohort analysis
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and adaptive immune system and coordination of immune 
responses, and hence result in older people being more 
susceptible to emerging infectious diseases, such as 
SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and other viruses.23–25 Coordination 
of SARS-CoV-2-specific CD4 and CD8 T-cell responses 
have been found to be disrupted in individuals aged 
65 years and older but not in younger individuals.26 
Additionally, scarcity of naive T cells was associated with 
ageing and worse COVID-19 outcomes.26 In light of this 
evidence, our analysis highlights the need to protect older 
people against reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 by vaccination, 
physical distancing measures, and personal protective 
equipment, such as facemasks, regardless of previous 
infection status.
The reinfection potential of health-care workers is of 
particular interest because of their high risk of exposure 
to the virus and frequent tests regardless of clinical signs 
and symptoms. In our sensitivity analysis of health-care 
workers, we found similar results as in our main analysis. 
Several seroprevalence studies of health-care workers 
have found that the risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 is 
higher in this group than in the general population.20,27–29 
In one study from Iran, the seroprevalence for IgG was 
almost 20%.27 A seroprevalence study among health-care 
workers in Denmark found that the risk of infection 
was 1·38 times higher in front-line health-care workers 
working in COVID-19 wards than in other health-care 
workers in the hospital.30 In our study, we found that the 
infection rate among health-care professionals was 
around twice that in the general population.
A main strength of our study is the size and com-
pleteness of our dataset, which is based on the entire 
population of Denmark and includes every individual 
that has been tested for SARS-CoV-2 between Feb 26 and 
Dec 31, 2020. We took advantage of the fact that Denmark 
has a large testing capacity, offering free testing within 
the population without needing a referral, and regardless 
of age, whether an individual is symptomatic or asymp-
tomatic, or whether they suspect infection or not. This 
framework enabled us to study differences within age 
groups. As described, test facilities became more easily 
accessible over the course of the study period and the 
number of tests done per week increased by up to 
ten times in the second surge compared within the first 
surge. We do not think the change in the overall number 
of tests done has affected our analysis; in fact, the change 
might have made our analysis more complete because 
those who had a positive test in the first surge would 
probably not have been restricted in their access to testing 
during the second surge.
Knowledge of a first positive test could potentially 
affect the behaviour of an individual, resulting in dif-
ferential misclassification. Individuals with a previous 
positive PCR test might engage in more high-risk 
activities (eg, not wearing a facemask) because of 
assumed immunity, and therefore be more likely to test 
positive a second time. By contrast, and probably more 
likely, such individuals might be less likely to have a 
second PCR test because they might believe themselves 
to be immune. Such behaviour would result in an 
overestimation of the protective effect of previous 
infection. We addressed this potential overestimation in 
two ways: by adjusting analyses for the number of tests 
done and through the sensitivity analysis of health-care 
workers. The results of this analysis corroborated the 
results of the main analysis. The different approaches 
we adopted to the analysis of the data did not change the 
overall findings, and neither did changing the defined 
time period between the first and second surges. In fact, 
the increase in the period between surges resulted in a 
slight increase in observed protection against repeat 
infection, suggesting that the criteria for reinfection 
became more specific because fewer recrudescent 
infections were misclassified as reinfec tions. Therefore, 
we believe we can draw representative conclusions 
about protection against repeat infection in the 
population.
One of the limitations of our study is that we could not 
correlate symptoms with protection against repeat 
infection because detailed clinical parameters are not 
typically recorded unless the patient was admitted to 
hospital due to severe COVID-19 symptoms. Our dataset 
includes test results from people with few or no 
symptoms that might have resulted in a comparatively 
lower immune response than if we had only included 
individuals with moderate or severe symptoms. How-
ever, had we included only individuals with moderate 
or severe infections, our findings would then have 
been generalisable only to individuals with symptomatic 
infections. Also, misclassification of reinfections might 
have occurred if detectable virus RNA lingered for more 
than 3 months in some patients. However, this potential 
bias is unlikely to have affected our results substan-
tially because we addressed this potential misclassification 
in the analysis by altering the defined time period 
between the pandemic surges. Some misclassifications 
by PCR tests might have occurred; however, the test used 
is believed to be highly accurate, with a sensitivity 
of 97·1% and specificity of 99·98%.31 Therefore, we 
would only expect approximately two false positive 
results for every 10 000 tests in uninfected people and 
approximately three false negative results for every 
100 tests in people who are infected. Our findings are 
only very slightly affected when taking account of test 
accuracy (data not shown). Finally, new variants of 
SARS-CoV-2 with the 484K or 501Y receptor binding area 
substitutions have recently appeared in Denmark,32–34 
with some variants known to be more transmissable 
then the original.35,36 During the study period, such 
variants were not yet established in Denmark; although 
into 2021 this pattern is changing.37 More prospective and 
longitudinal cohort studies coupled with molecular 
surveillance are needed to characterise antibody titres 
and waning of protection against repeat infections and 
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the effect of antigenic shifts or drifts of the virus on 
immunity.
In summary, we found that protection against repeat 
SARS-CoV-2 infection is robust and detectable in the 
majority of individuals, protecting 80% or more of the 
naturally infected population who are younger than 
65 years against reinfections within the observation 
period. However, we observed that individuals aged 
65 years and older had less than 50% protection against 
repeat SARS-CoV-2 infection. Because the older age 
group is more prone to a serious clinical course of 
illness, this finding highlights the need to implement 
protective measures for the older population in the form 
of effective vaccines and enhanced physical distancing 
and infection control, even in those known to be 
previously infected. Furthermore, our data indicate that 
vaccination of previously infected individuals should be 
done because natural protection cannot be relied on.
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